

1918—



—1945

 Alfred University Reading Room
 Alfred

Entered as 2nd class matter

New York ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIV, No. 33

JUNE 1, 1945

LACK OF CLEAR OBJECTIVES HAMPERS U.S. IN EUROPE

En Route from San Francisco to New York—Now that the conference of 49 nations on problems of international organization is drawing to a close, it becomes increasingly apparent that its most valuable accomplishment will have been the opportunity it provided for a sharply etched re-appraisal of the world situation in the wake of the European war, before the victors had to define the concrete terms of the peace settlement. The conference, outwardly preoccupied with technical questions of procedure, became from the start a sounding-board for existing or potential conflicts the war had held in abeyance. The Charter it is drafting will represent the lowest common denominator on which agreement could be reached at this time. To many people who had hoped for more exalted achievement, the Charter may prove in some respects disappointing. But it is far better for all the United Nations to know approximately where they stand now than to keep on seeking unattainable objectives spun of nothing more substantial than wishful thinking.

U.S.-RUSSIAN CONFLICT NOT INEVITABLE. The most disquieting development at the conference was the tendency to believe that a conflict between the United States and Russia is becoming inevitable. This tendency was greatly inflated and encouraged by some irresponsible commentators and reporters who seemed more interested in the conflicts that are bound to flare up among nations than in determined day-to-day efforts to arrive at agreement on controversial issues. There is, obviously, a wide range of matters on which the United States and Russia do not see eye to eye in Europe, but so far there is no fundamental reason why the two countries should not find a workable basis for post-war cooperation. The chief difficulty is that while Russia has a very clear idea of the ways and means by which it intends to achieve security on the continent,

this country still has no clearly defined objective in Europe beyond that of keeping the continent from becoming the theatre of another war in which the United States would once more be bound to intervene. We therefore tend to let matters drift until the Russians have taken some positive action—and then react against Russia's decisions, instead of taking the initiative ourselves. As a result, our policy assumes more and more the character of opposition to Russia's aims in Europe when, in reality, if we were to reach our own conclusions about disputed matters like the régimes of Poland and Austria we might find that our views and those of the Soviet government concerning the future of Eastern Europe and the Balkans are not as far apart as they seem. To reach well-thought-out conclusions, however, we need a much larger staff of officials conversant with the problems of that area, and familiar with Russia, than is at present available in the State Department. Dramatic improvisation by special emissaries in moments of acute crisis does not take the place of the knowledge and experience which should be brought to bear on our negotiations with Russia.

BRITAIN'S NEW BALANCE OF POWER. Our relations with Russia have come to depend, to a degree that at San Francisco was revealed as dangerous, on our relations with Britain. The British, whose political influence and economic position have been undermined by the war, are necessarily playing from weakness. Some British officials give the impression that they would like to keep the United States and Russia apart—not to an extent that would threaten the security of Europe, but to the extent that would permit Britain to develop a new policy of balance of power between its two mighty wartime associates. It would be regrettable, however, if the United States which, under President Roosevelt, succeeded in mediating between

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

Churchill and Stalin, should drift more or less unconsciously into a position where it would have to back Britain against Russia on the continent. President Truman's decision, announced on May 24, to send Joseph C. Davies, former Ambassador to Moscow, to canvass the situation with Prime Minister Churchill, while Harry Hopkins simultaneously canvasses it with Stalin, indicates that a firm attempt will be made to dispel the serious malaise which has developed in Europe during the Conference.

Just as the United States must define its positive objectives with respect to Russia, so it must define them with respect to Britain. It is difficult to believe that the American people will want to support, in Europe, the policy of opposition to Leftist elements and sympathy for monarchy frequently expressed by Mr. Churchill, or will want to abandon the hope that, ultimately, dependent peoples will be prepared by the nations that control them for some form of independence. Yet our fear of Russia, and our own desire to obtain control of strategic bases in the Pacific may, if unchecked, lead us to adopt a course that could be regarded by other peoples as reactionary. And it is at this very point that Russia, which certainly cannot claim to have assured the peoples under its control either a full range of human rights or what we in the Western world would regard as independence, could nevertheless continue, along the course set by Molotov at San Francisco, to assume the leadership in world affairs which the United States has failed to exert.

FRENCH PLANS FOR SECURITY. In the midst of the tensions generated among the Big Three by the end of war in Europe, France has indicated its readiness to act as a connecting link between the Western powers and Russia. The French do not believe that either Britain or the United States will stay long in Europe—some of them put the period of Anglo-American occupation at less than two years. They are therefore preparing themselves for the eventuality of having to face Germany alone once more. Their plan of action is four-fold: occupation of the Rhineland by French forces; establish-

ment of an international commission, including France, to control the Ruhr, with the expectation that Germany would thus be shorn of 70 per cent of its coal, and consequently of the possibility of producing steel in sufficient quantities for modern warfare; creation of a network of security pacts, the Franco-Russian pact to be matched in the West by a similar pact with Britain; and participation as one of the Big Five in the United Nations organization. The Anglo-French alliance has been delayed partly because the French, before they negotiate it, want to have definite assurances concerning the role they are to play in the occupation and administration of Germany, and partly because of frictions between France and Britain, notably in Syria and Lebanon, where riots occurred last week on the arrival of French troops.

These problems are only symptoms of the vast upheavals that are shaking Europe and the Near and Middle East now that the danger of German domination has been removed. It had long been evident that the end of hostilities would merely mean the beginning of arduous efforts to resolve the problems which brought about this war, and which the war itself has not solved. The United States, now militarily and industrially the most powerful nation in the world, has the opportunity to play as great a role in the making of the peace as it has in the waging of the war. This country alone among the great powers is not suspected of having territorial designs on the continent, and is by tradition committed neither to reaction nor revolution. It is therefore peculiarly well qualified to keep the balance between the conflicting interests of other nations, which have suffered far more than we have from the devastation of war, and are naturally even more anxious than we are about the character of the peace. In assuming our post-war responsibilities it is essential that we should all realize that the maintenance of peacetime relations requires qualities of patience and understanding far greater than those we were called on to display in time of war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

BRITISH ELECTIONS TO HINGE ON RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES

Facing its first general election since 1935, Britain has entered a political campaign which will bring a new Parliament and perhaps a new government to Westminster. The present Parliament, the longest in modern British history, has undergone many changes in the last ten years. First, the leadership veered from the nationalist government of Stanley Baldwin to that of Neville Chamberlain during the ill-fated appeasement period. At the time of the invasion of the Low Countries in 1940, the "Cassandra" of the Conservative party, Mr. Churchill, came to the Premiership to form the coalition war cabinet

which has successfully concluded the European phase of the war. With the resignation of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet on May 23, the two major parties have now to contest the election at the polls on July 5 to determine which of them shall conduct the final phase of the war against Japan, set the stage for post-war reconstruction at home, and chart Britain's future course in foreign affairs.

FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES. Considerations of foreign policy will not figure prominently during the campaign, although the Chamberlain policies of the Conservative party will doubt-

less be aired at length by Labor candidates. Mr. Churchill has so successfully personified Britain's spirit in resisting its enemies during the war that much of the bitterness against the earlier appeasement tactics of his party may have been dispelled. In announcing that the election would not interfere with a meeting of the Big Three, the Prime Minister has not only struck a confident note but has expressed Britain's intention of retaining its position in United Nations councils.

Labor spokesmen can face the electorate with fewer qualms than the Conservatives about coordinating British and Russian policy—especially in Europe. For the Labor party has consistently pressed for cooperation with the Soviet Union and closer ties with Leftist groups which have emerged on the continent. Aside from these divergences in the field of external affairs, the Labor party will express greater differences with respect to imperial relations. While favoring continued cooperation with the Dominions, Labor does not propose closer institutional ties for Commonwealth unity. Greater emphasis will be placed on the necessity of colonial development, breaking the deadlock on India, and reversing the policy regarding Palestine. At its London Conference last year, the Labor party suggested revision of the 1939 White Paper so that Jewish immigration could continue, the size of Palestine be increased and Arab populations transferred to other areas.

DOMESTIC ISSUES REAL. Most observers are agreed that the election will turn, not on issues of foreign policy, but on plans already executed or proposed for the economic and social reconstruction of Britain after the war. Again, in so far as economic considerations affect Britain's foreign position, there will be little disagreement between the parties. For few Britishers, regardless of party, are unmindful of the nation's precarious foreign economic situation. Both parties view with favor plans for expansion of the export trade on which Britain must depend if it is to recoup the wartime loss on external investments that have always played a significant role in balancing the nation's international payments.

It is rather on the domestic angle of this program that the sharpest clash will occur. During the debates on the Full Employment White Paper last year, it was clearly revealed that both parties were in agreement on its aims—reviving the export industries and increasing the export trade. But the Labor party has maintained that to do this necessitates a program involving greater public ownership of the basic industries and services than the White Paper has indicated. Both groups agree, however, that—as a minimum—great state intervention and control of economic life will be necessary.

Although this is the same debate—public ownership vs. free enterprise—which has continued in Britain since World War I, the issues are sharper today because the area of debate has been pushed considerably closer to actual government ownership than before. The state has exercised full economic controls during the war and, in rebuilding British industry, rehousing bombed-out families, and city planning, it will have to exercise vast controls anew. Distribution of industry is to be planned, the land necessary for city planning virtually pre-empted, and labor directed to those areas where it is needed. Health and educational facilities are to be expanded, along with increased social security benefits.

The coalition government presented these plans in a series of White Papers during 1943 and 1944. A majority of the White Papers have not yet been implemented by legislation and those which have been interpreted in law have not satisfied most Labor members of Parliament, who have felt free to criticize them. Laborites will doubtless go to their constituencies on issues involving these domestic matters, and it is expected that housing especially will prove a rallying point in the campaign. Thus, despite much agreement on foreign policy, the Labor party can contest the election with real hope, for the domestic issues are sharp and close to each voter's personal knowledge. On the other hand, the Conservatives can count on Mr. Churchill's unrivaled personal prestige deriving from his astute leadership during the war.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE SHARPENS POLITICAL DIFFERENCES IN CHINA

The military problems arising from China's continuing disunity have been obscured by European political issues and the San Francisco Conference. At the same time sensational air attacks on Japan, including devastating raids on Tokyo, have quite properly won the spotlight in the news from the Far East. But Japan will not be defeated by one nation or one method alone, and in the months ahead we will need all the support we can get from our allies in Asia. The achievement of political unity in China, with all the resulting military advantages, is a major immediate requirement in the war against Japan.

It is true that there has been an improvement in the military position of the Chungking government and that the cities of Foochow and Nanning are again in Chinese hands. The Chinese Communist armies also report highly successful spring operations in the northern and central provinces. But the Chungking forces remain sorely in need of strengthening from within, and China needs an end to the Kuomintang blockade of the Eighth Route Army's headquarters area in the Yen-an region. Yet the political factors responsible for military disunity seem further than ever from settlement.

TRENDS IN CHINA. At present there are three main currents in Chinese politics (1) Chungking is planning to adopt a constitution, despite the absence of political unity; (2) Yen-an is expanding and consolidating the liberated areas under its control; (3) liberal groups in Chungking territory are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the course taken by the Central government. All these tendencies are influenced by the policies of the great powers, especially that of the United States as formulated by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley.

A resolution to hold a constitutional convention in November 1945 was adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang, whose meetings ended on May 21. American discussion of this move has tended to regard constitutionalism and popular government as synonymous terms. Yet it is well known that, while virtually all the independent countries of the world have constitutions, very few existing states can be considered democratic. In judging Chungking's plans, it is therefore necessary to see what kind of a document the proposed constitution is, how it is to be adopted, and what the probable effects of its promulgation will be.

CONSTITUTION WITHOUT DEMOCRACY. Even a cursory examination of the Draft Constitution, which the Chungking government proposes to adopt this year, raises serious questions as to whether the text contains the framework of a popular régime. The Draft provides for a National Congress which would normally meet one month in every three years, unless it was found necessary to lengthen a session for an additional month or to call an extraordinary session. The most important function of the National Congress would be to elect the President of the Chinese Republic and certain other high government officials. Not one of the leading officials of the central régime would be chosen by direct, popular election. It seems improbable that a congress meeting so infrequently could serve as more than a rubber stamp for rule by executive action. In effect, China under this constitution would lack any body genuinely resembling a national legislature.

The constitutional convention, it is true, will possess the right to make changes in the Draft; but in view of current political conditions in Chungking territory, there is no reason to expect the majority of delegates to display a spirit of political independence. None will have been popularly elected, and the core of the congress probably will consist of

current Kuomintang leaders and delegates chosen by the Kuomintang nine years ago for a constitutional convention that was postponed because of the outbreak of the present war with Japan.

There was a time several years ago when the adoption of a constitution by a reasonably representative body might have promoted Chinese unity and helped the war effort. But that was in a period when the relations of Chungking and Yen-an were better than an armed truce. Today the deterioration is so marked that, unless outstanding political questions are settled soon, moves to adopt a constitution threaten to crystallize existing differences.

CONGRESS AT YENAN. The fact that Chungking was planning to press for a constitution very likely influenced the convening of the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist party at Yen-an in the latter part of April. The discussions at this Congress indicate that Yen-an has been consolidating and expanding at a very rapid pace. In fact, Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communists, declared that the areas liberated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies now contain more than 95,000,000 people. Especially significant was Mao's suggestion that "a conference of people's representatives from all parts of liberated China should be called in Yen-an as soon as possible to discuss measures for unifying the activities of all liberated areas, giving leadership to the anti-Japanese democratic movement among the people in Kuomintang-controlled areas and the underground movement of the people in occupied areas, and promoting the unity of the entire country and the formation of a coalition government." This suggests that Yen-an may be planning political moves of its own to anticipate Chungking's action on the constitution.

In these circumstances the attitude of non-Kuomintang, non-Communist minority groups in Chungking territory is extremely important. A number of these minority groups, organized in the Democratic League, have shown marked apathy toward constitutionalism without democracy. According to Carson Chang, a leader of one of the groups in the League and a member of the Chinese delegation at San Francisco, "the urgent need for unity demands that a coalition government be established immediately." Another leader of the Democratic League, Li Hwang, who is also on the San Francisco delegation, has attacked the arrangements for the constitutional convention as undemocratic and dictatorial.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIV, No. 33, JUNE 1, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LBET, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.